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FROM AN INSTRUMENT 
TO THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF “EUROPEAN OPINION” 
 
Elements For a Historical Sociology of Community Instruments 
 
Philippe ALDRIN* 
____ 
 
 
hrough their very existence, European studies tend to reinforce the 
certainty that the European Union (EU) is the product and the 
matrix of an unprecedented political process– an exception to the 
rule laid out by classical theories on the institutionalisation of 
Nation-States [Pierson, 1996]. The supposed sui generis properties of the 
EU are largely responsible for the fact that traditional models of analysis of 
political phenomena are not applied to European political phenomena. 
However, the epistemological and empirical arguments to support the 
notion of a radical alterity of the political material – be it conceptual, 
human, administrative, legal – that has built Europe as a Community 
require closer examination. This article will argue that beyond the specific 
object of our study, the EU is a political object that requires the same 
sociological approaches as other political objects where this approach 
seems only “natural”. On the basis of a survey conducted in the services of 
the European Commission’s Directorate General (DG) Communication1, I 
apply to the EU communication apparatus the same hypotheses that are 
commonly applied to more “classical” political institutions [Franklin, 2004; 
Georgakakis, 2004]. This continuist stance [Dobry, 1986:14-28] in no way 
negates or underestimates the specificity of the “culture” and decision-
making procedures of the EU or of certain types of issues faced by the EU. 
By focusing on the frames2 and the instruments of European 
                                                
* Philippe Aldrin is Professor in Political Science at The University of Nice (France) and member of The Centre 
for European Political Sociology (Sciences Po Strasburg) 
1 This article is based on the systematic reading of the Commission and the European Parliament’s archives and on 
interviews with the actors of the EU’s communication policy, conducted in Brussels, Strasbourg, Paris and 
Berlin. 
2 By “frames” we refer to the order of signification, the certainties, the concepts that guide discourses and actions 
of European actors. These frames are perceived in the lines of actions (“political”, “strategic”, “plan of action”) 
and the spaces of justifications that collective actors apply to themselves and demonstrate publicly. A frame 
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communication policy– i.e. on Community instruments of measure, 
analysis of opinions and management of the public space – I aim first and 
foremost to show how Community actors have historically assessed, 
constructed and handled3 the “problem” of European public opinion. 
 
In keeping with the perspective of this book, this chapter places emphasis 
on three of the most salient conclusions of the survey it is based upon. The 
historical account of the Commission’s information-communication policy 
will retrace the historicity of “European public opinion” as a perceived 
problem within the Commission services. This analysis points to the early 
presence, originating in the 1960s, of a conceptualisation and of systems of 
evaluation and resolution of the problem. The success or full efficiency of 
the latter, as measured by the huge importance accorded to public opinion 
since the 1990s on, has more to do with the favourable restructuring of the 
internal and external tensions of the European political game than with a 
feedback or spill over consequence of the integration process [Haas, 1958]. 
The socio-historical analysis of the European Community (EC)’s 
communication apparatus then reveals the extent to which its structuring 
conceptions are malleable. The redefinition of the objectives and the 
means of European communication – from the original sectoral approach 
(“the information policy of the Communities”) to a more global approach 
(“a European communication policy”) is linked to the conceptual and 
technical changes of the instrumental equipment of European public 
action. However, these changes were not specific to the EU, as the 
processes of professionalisation and rationalization of the EU’s 
communication apparatus followed the same pattern as local and national 
executives in Europe at the same time [Olivier-Yaniv, 2000; Legavre, 
2005]. Lastly, studying the work of EC agents highlights the importance of 
policy entrepreneurship in the construction of opinion and communication 
as a “European problem”. To some extent this is a new illustration of the 
weight of the civil service within the dynamics of European public action 
[Peters, 1992] as they mobilize internal and external networks, gain support 
and material resources in order to legitimize Commission initiatives and 
choices in the face of resistance from member states.4 But the genealogy of 
the instruments used to achieve these goals – in particular the 
sophistication of the Eurobarometer tool and its uses – also uncovers the 
tentative, sometimes improvised, but systematically opportunistic character 
[Kingdon, 1984] of such undertakings, in contradiction with the strategist 
vision of a political decision centre marked by a unanimous representation 
of coherent EC goals and a shared will to achieve them. 
 
I will then seek to describe and recontextualize the successive adjustments 
in the approach of the opinion “problem” within EC institutions. At each 
significant stage of this redefinition of the “problem”, I will attempt to 
                                                                                                                                      
perspective is also about pointing out how these frames can be used as prognoses, diagnoses and justifications 
for common principles of action. See[Benford and Snow, 2000] and on political choices [Rein and Schön, 1991]. 
 3 See Christopher Hood’s groundbreaking analysis of the “tools” of control and action of governments 
[Hood, 1986]. 
4 Following the model of advocacy coalitions, theorized by Sabatier [Sabatier, 1998] 
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show the links between the conceptual evolution and the instrumental 
equipment of communication within the decision-making space.5 
  
 
THE POWERLESS CONDITION 
OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COMMUNICATION 
From the Community effort of information 
to the European opinion “problem” 
  
Contrarily to what the advocates of a retrospective vision of its history 
claim, the EC has since its inception been attuned to the question of public 
opinion. Various elements show that EC officials did not wait for the 
political shift of the Maastricht Treaty (1991), the launch of the single 
currency (2002) or the electoral debacle of the project for a constitutional 
treaty (2005) to become interested in public opinion. Immediately 
following their creation, the executives of the three Communities (ECSC, 
EEC, Euratom) established services that ensured the diffusion of 
information on their activities for journalists and the populations 
concerned. Very early on, administrative and political officials monitored 
media coverage of Community activity and financed opinion polls on 
public perceptions of the Communities in each member country. The 
Commission, which centralized an information service shared by the three 
Communities, created the Eurobarometer in 1973. It was an internal 
instrument (activating external service providers) of biannual measurement 
of opinions in member countries. Under the first Delors presidency, the 
Commissioners adopted the Priority Information Programmes (PIP), and 
launched full-fledged “marketing campaigns” (partnerships with sporting 
events, launch of the “European Year”) in order to make EC initiatives 
and policies widely known [Melich 1989]. The Commission was clearly 
supported by the European Parliament in this effort to inform and evaluate 
the attitudes of “populations”. As early as 19726, MEPs adopted very firm 
resolutions on the “information policy” of the Communities, 
recommending an increased mobilisation of resources and the systematic 
recourse to the most modern communication techniques7. If the genesis of 
the EC’s instruments of measure of opinions and management of the 
public space was present at the very start of European administrations and 
institutions, the sequential reconstruction of EC communication tends to 
show that, at least during the last two decades, both the range of these 
activities and instruments and the “problem” they purported to solve have 
shifted on several occasions. 
 
                                                
5 I follow here a constructivist tradition of research that “takes ideas seriously” and analyses instruments and their 
uses as “tracers” of these ideas [Lascoumes, Le Galès 2004b]. 
6 On the basis of the Dutch MEP Wilhelmus Schuijt’s report in the name of the political Commission of the 
European Parliament [SCHUIJT 1972]. 
7 Although taking care to distinguish public relations from propaganda, the 1972 Schuijt report mentions the 
possibility of resorting to advertising techniques: “We can ask ourselves whether the possibility of renting 
airtime or newspaper space should be ruled out” He also insists on the “creation of the Community’s image”, a 
guarantee that “the character, the quality, the motivation and the objectives of a company are respected” 
[SCHUIJT 1972: 18, 10]. 
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Although initially labelled as a “policy”, strictly speaking, the information 
activity of the Community was not, at least when it started, a supranational 
public policy; it had no vocation to serve a collective good, solve a social 
problem or meet the needs of a specific fraction of the population. In the 
early stages of the Common Market, the objectives of this policy were to 
popularize the activities of EC institutions towards target populations. 
There was a first shift of this information activity – which was not however 
framed as a political problem– when the attitudes of “European public 
opinion” became a question of democratic legitimization. Indeed, the 
political order of the EC was progressively democratised from the late 
1970s with the direct election of MEPs in 1979, the extension of the 
Parliament’s attributions and the increasing use of referendums for the 
national ratification of European treaties. For a unification process that 
had been until then based on diplomatic negotiations ratified by national 
political elites, the challenge of universal suffrage made opposition to 
Europe more visible, and probably also more politically coherent. While 
they realized that popular support for Europe was waning in ballot boxes 
and polls, the actors of the EC process noted the emergence of a critical 
discourse denouncing the “democratic deficit” [Marquant 1979], the 
“stateless bureaucracy” of “Brussels Eurocrates” under the influence of 
lobbies, ranging from occasional bursts of Euroscepticism to the politically 
organized Europhobia of sovereigntists and anti-capitalist movements. The 
EC spread geographically, extended its capacity of intervention8 in member 
countries, and the issue of popular support, and consequently of the 
manifest proof – through votes or polls – of its democratic legitimacy, 
became more pressing. The awareness of this new situation modified the 
dominant framing of the opinion problem. Convinced that informational 
pedagogy was no longer enough to ensure popular support, the EC actors 
who were the most dedicated to the defence of the unification process – 
MEPs and political and administrative Commission officials in particular – 
started taking numerous initiatives in order to attempt to curb indifference, 
fear or rejection of Europe. The tone and the recommendations of the 
report9 adopted by MEPs in 1986 are a striking example of this: 
  
“A simple effort of factual information and awareness to European institutions is 
not sufficient to defeat the feeling of all the parts that compose Europe that they 
belong to distinct entities, which is the main reason for the indifference to 
common institutions. (…) A modern information policy should include two 
equally important aspects: information and communication.” [Baget-Bozzo, 1986: 
6-7]. Aside from increasing budgets, the report recommended “the rationalization 
and strengthening of the information policy towards groups and associations that 
are opinion multiplicators, i.e. primarily journalists, professional organizations and 
various interest groups, such as environmental protection groups, women’s groups, 
youth organizations and European movements.” [id.: 10]. In order to implement 
this “plan of action”, the MEPs recommend “resorting to the most appropriate 
means of communication: television, radio, newspapers, poster campaigns, 
advertising” and “systematically using instruments of measure of public opinion: 
polls and surveys like the Eurobarometer”[id.: 10-11]. 
 
                                                
8 The Delors Plan (1985) and the ratification of the Single European Act (1986) paved the way for the 
construction of the Single Market (1986-1992), which caused a considerable rise of the legislative initiatives – 
and in the normative and restrictive intervention – of the Commission. 
9 Based on Italian MEP Gianni Baget Bozzo’s report [BAGET BOZZO 1986] 
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The information effort progressively led to a new institutional treatment of 
the problem, wherein the mobilization of opinion was to be achieved with 
the tools of mass communication. This political stake, crystallised by the 
phrase “the democratic challenge”, grew to be so important that it seeped 
into every aspect of the EC’s structure from the late 1980s on. The 
initiatives aiming to increase the “transparency” of decision-making 
processes10, to further “institutional reform” 11 should be seen in this light, 
as well as all the actions aiming to formally democratize Europe. Thus at 
the turn of the 1990s, when the apathy of European citizens appeared as a 
threat to the integration process, the Community information effort was 
rephrased as a European problem of democratic legitimacy.12 Even if they 
had been developed since the early stages of the Communities, the EC’s 
tools of management of the public space (spokesperson’s service, 
publications, relays and networks, etc) and of measure of opinions (the 
Eurobarometer), only became a political instrument when mass public 
support to the EC became a vital political issue for the Community. By 
outlining the socio-technical13 combinations that have successively 
determined the definition and treatment of this problem, we will see how 
the functional instrumentation of information (instruments aim to inform 
the populations concerned and opinion leaders) has been replaced by a 
sectoral instrumentation of communication (instruments serving as a 
cognitive measure allowing the harnessing of cognitive benefits of mass 
opinion). 
 
Early stages of the European communication apparatus 
 
The shared information service of the three Communities, set up in the 
early 1960s on the initiative of the EP, initially sought to build contacts 
with national and local media and spread information to the populations 
concerned by EC action. Nevertheless, each of the three executives still 
had their own press speaker, who interacted with the media present in 
Brussels and Luxemburg14, enabling them to be reactive and keep sensitive 
issues under control. The merger of the executives15 in 1967 forced 
Community officials to find a new rationality in the organization of 
external relations. A single Spokesman’s Service soon included the press 
speakers of the various Commissioners under the direct authority of the 
President of the Commission16 in charge of relations with accredited 
journalists present in Brussels. These daily relations took the form of 
“midday briefings” where the “accredited” came to listen to the press 
                                                
10 See in particular “Institutional Declaration on Democracy, Transparency, and Subsidiarity” (Bulletin of the 
European Communities, 10/1993). 
11 See the dispositions in the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon treaties to reinforce the EP’s attributions. 
12 On the useful distinction between a “Community problem” and a “European problem”, see Smith, 2004. 
13 The term « socio-technical » refers to Bruno Latour’s actor network theory. I do not have the same scientific 
agenda, but I am following up on his invitation to reconsider the effects of objects (and therefore of systems, 
tools and instruments) on logics of collective mobilization and action [Latour 1994]. 
14 Giorgio Smoquina then Bino Olivi directed the EEC’s spokesperson’s service; Jean Poorterman headed the 
Euratom’s and Luis Janz the ECSC’s. 
15 In 1952, the ECSC’s High Authority was set up in Luxembourg. In 1958, the EEC’s Commission was 
established in Brussels. After the Merger Treaty of 1965, it became the Commission of the European 
Communities (ECSC, Euratom and EEC). 
16 Bino Olivi was put in charge of the Spokesman’s Service of the unified Commission. 
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speaker and ask questions in the pressroom of the Commission 
headquarters [Bastin 2003]. With the merger, the Information Service 
became the Directorate-General of Information and Communication (DG-
X), a full-fledged administrative subdivision of the Commission17. 
 
The “information policy” structured in the 1960s covered various services 
holding very traditional functions of public relations such as press relations 
and editing documents on the activity of Community institutions. From 
the very start, the institutional conception of European information was 
inspired by trendy scientific theories on public space, societal tendencies 
and social influence, as well as by strategic and technical progress in the 
field of communication. The sacralization of the press briefing – for which 
former journalists were already in charge at that time, under the direct 
authority of the President of the Commission – as a major act of 
communication is symptomatic of this “age” of political communication 
[Blumler 1995]. The choices that structured the organisation and the 
equipment of the Community’s communication apparatus until the 1980s 
attest to this reactivity to contemporary debates and innovations, notably 
on two aspects that would become central: relations with the press and the 
media on the one hand, opinion polls on the other. 
In the post-war years, government management of the media in western 
European countries was mostly limited to the setting up of administrative 
services in charge of drafting press releases and reviews for government 
members.18 Assimilated with propaganda of totalitarian regimes, 
communication campaigns organised by governments were then few and 
far between and only dealt with politically neutral themes (fight against 
social scourges such as alcoholism; civic messages). Ministries and their 
specialised administrations limited themselves to spreading technical and 
practical information to “their” audiences (agricultural workers, industrials, 
CEOs, teachers, etc.) [Olivier-Yaniv 2000]. The Communities’ 
relationships with journalists – and their relationships with populations – 
partake in this cybernetic approach19 to communication: the institution 
provides information through various channels, and then receives feedback 
on that information thanks to press reviews and opinion polls. Public 
institutions only started making systematic use of interviews, press tribunes 
or rented space in mass media in the 1980s, when commercial sponsors 
themselves resorted increasingly to institutional communication, thereby 
making the audience familiar with a form of communication where the 
message is not exclusively centred on the promotion of a product, but on 
the identification with values or projects. The founding principles and the 
evolution of European information thus strictly follow the models of 
communication techniques used by member States. 
 
                                                
17 The German Louis Janz was DG-X’s first director, but he was soon replaced by his countryman Karl Heinz 
Narjes (former Head of Cabinet for W. Hallstein and later on Commissioner).  
18 After the war, European democracies created central services: the Federal press office in FRG, the Central 
Office of Information in England and later on the Service de liaison interministériel à l’information in France. 
19 On the cybernetic approach to communication inspired by Norbert Wiener’s research, its uses and 
interpretations, see Winkin 2001: 27-53. 
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The Information Service was at first a minimalist administrative apparatus 
in charge of informing and observing the media [Rabier 1993]. 
Symptomatically, its size and scope would mirror the evolution of the 
integration process itself and more generally reflect the rise and fall of the 
authority of the Commission within the institutional game. The 
organisation and the objectives remained identical when the Information 
Service was transformed into a Directorate General of Press and 
Information after the merger (1967), and subsequently into a Directorate 
General of Press and Communication or DG-X (1973). Two main 
principles guided the structuring of these services. First, the staff was 
dispatched to central services (the Commission headquarters in Brussels) 
or external offices (in the capitals of member countries and in Geneva, 
London, New York City, Montevideo and Washington). Secondly, efforts 
were concentrated on audiences perceived as priority targets [Meijers 
1965]: journalists (to ensure contact with the general public), and 
“determined audiences” i.e. professional categories concerned by 
Community policies (professional organizations, trade unions, agricultural 
workers), as well as the milieus expected to be interested in the 
Community’s project of integration (teachers at all levels). The Information 
Service employed about 100 people at its creation, and over 200 upon 
transformation into a DG.20 The information policy instruments remained 
basic as most of the activity consisted in drafting and disseminating 
informative brochures and magazines, and in putting together press 
reviews for the cabinets of Commissioners. DG-X’s work was therefore no 
different from that of the nascent press and information services that were 
being created in other DGs [Joana, Smith, 2002]. 
 
 
Europeans and Europe…  
before the invention of “European public opinion” 
 
The political and administrative officials of the Information Service were 
influenced by the dominant trends in social sciences on public opinion 
issues. As post-war European sociology was openly disinterested in social 
phenomena related to opinion [Lautman 1981], the scientific knowledge on 
the mechanisms of formation of opinions emanated mainly from theories 
derived from experimental American psychosociology based on polling 
techniques. The few European scholars interested in opinion, such as Jean 
Stoetzel in France or Elisabeth Noelle in Germany, acted as mediators for 
American science of opinion and introduced polling techniques in their 
national academic spaces.21 This psychosociological approach to opinion 
would deeply influence Jacques-René Rabier, a high-ranking Commission 
official who played a crucial role in the first institutionalisation of the 
services and logics of the European opinion policy. Indeed, he was the 
                                                
20 The Schuijt report (1972) mentions 215 civil servants and 71 “other agents”. 
21 After a stay in New York, where he worked with Paul Lazarsfeld’s team on mass media research, Jean Stoetzel 
founded the French institute of public opinion (the first French polling institute) and launched the Sondages 
(Polls) journal in 1963. He sheds light on the American roots of his axiological and methodological approach to 
public opinion in Stoetzel, 1963. E. Noelle left to the US in the late 1930s and completed a PhD in opinion 
studies. After the war, she and her husband Erich Peter Neumann founded the demoscopy institute of 
Allensbach [Noelle 1974]. 
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director of the Information Service from the beginning, and then Director-
General of DG-X and founder of the Eurobarometer (v. infra box). In the 
mid 1960s, almost ten years before the Eurobarometer was officially 
introduced, Rabier put forward a very precise assessment of opinion-
related issues for the Communities and of the communication tools 
necessary to face them. Strongly influenced by Lazarsfeld’s theory on the 
effect of mass media22 and the mechanisms of opinion, this conception was 
certainly not typical of high-ranking officials at the time, but it is 
nevertheless an extremely enlightening indication of the clarity of vision of 
one of the main entrepreneurs of European communication policy even at 
that early stage. In a lecture on “The information of Europeans” given at 
the Institute for European Studies in Brussels, the head of the Information 
Service provided one of the most enlightening contributions on the future 
European communication. Referring to the theories of such specialists as 
Jean Stoetzel23, David Easton24 and especially Paul Lazarsfeld, he 
highlighted “resistance, processes of protection and selection” of media 
messages25, always “transmitted in a more assimilable form, with affective 
connotations” by relatives, and argued in favour of a relativisation of the 
“mass” concept.26 Based on these observations, he emphasized the 
advantages of polling, portrayed as the only technique likely to overcome 
the usual quibbling and biased interpretations of opinion.27 On the basis of 
polls conducted in 196228 on civic attitudes and in 196329 on consumer 
behaviour in the six member States of the EEC, Rabier noted a 
“widespread adhesion of the public to the European idea” but “little 
curiosity for the steps of Europe’s construction”. Without mentioning it 
explicitly, Rabier borrowed Lazarsfeld’s classifying principles of political 
interest30 and, using data from these polls, defined three categories of 
“attitudes towards political life and the unification of Europe in the EC”. 
These categories were indexed on socio-professional status, income, and 
the level of education, and distributed according to the following 
stratification: “well informed, interested and generally favourable” (20 to 
30%), “weakly politicized and generally favourable” (40 to 60%); “relative 
or absolute apathetic” citizens (20 to 30%). For Rabier, the results of these 
first polls “undeniably” mark the beginning of a “European consensus” 
produced by a “relative homogeneity of the natural and technical 
conditions of production” and the resemblance of the “attitudes towards 
life, shaped by a long history of cultural exchanges, cooperation and 
                                                
22 On the academic influence of the model developed by the Columbia school, see Pollak 1979.  
23 Paraphrasing him, he writes: “Strictly speaking, there is no public opinion, but collective phenomena of opinion, 
expression of attitudes or behaviours, observed with adequate techniques such as polls on representative 
samples” [Rabier, 1965: 35]. 
24 The text borrows from Easton’s conception of the political system transforming inputs into outputs [Easton, 
1957]. 
25 Numerous references are made to Lazarsfeld, Berelson, Gaudet 1944. 
26 A reference to Lazarsfeld’s Personal Influence [Lazarsfeld, Katz, 1955]. 
27 We find here the theme of an « alliance » between polls and democracy put forward by the American (Elmo 
Roper, George Gallup) and French (J. Stoetzel) advocates of the method. See Blondiaux, 1998: 211-226. 
28 Public opinion and the Europe of Six, a poll (on representative samples) conducted by Gallup International under the 
IFOP’s supervision, published in the first issue of Sondages in 1962. 
29 Products and People, a poll conducted and published by The Reader’s Digest Association in 1963. 
30 In order to differentiate the effects of political propaganda, Lazarsfeld and his colleagues created an index of 
political predisposition (based on socio-economic variables such as occupation, income, religion, location) that 
provided information on the political interest and exposure to media of the pollees [Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson, Gaudet, 1944]. 
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conflicts” [Rabier 1965: 18]. In light of these results, the director of the 
Information Service and soon to be director of the DG-X wrote: 
 
“A European information policy’s goal would be to support and “boost” 
favourable attitudes of active minorities; raise the interest level and increase the 
information of citizens who are both favourable and badly informed, or not very 
interested, and of those who are on a more or less vague level of consensus” 
[Rabier 1965: 32] 
 
Ideally, the EC’s strategy would be to focus communication towards the 
socially “better integrated groups and milieus” who would in turn act as 
relays, translators, information multipliers among their peers according to 
the “two-step flow of communication”31. But Rabier immediately went on 
to explain why this would not work: 
 
“These institutions [the EC’s] are hampered by a series of factors: 
1. The integration process is recent and the image of its reality has difficulty 
emerging against national imagery or ideological representations of a generous but 
vague internationalism. 
2. It follows that the most apparent forms and results of European integration, in 
the economic field, are quite technical, involve numerous and complex institutions 
bearing obscure acronyms, hence the absence of clear images, personalized faces, 
symbols with emotional resonances with which the popular psyche could form a 
connection. 
3. […] The participation of citizens in European integration is indirect and covert: 
as citizens of an emerging Europe, they do not even have the right to vote. 
4. The system of psychosocial conditioning occurs almost exclusively to the 
national sphere – in the fields of (notably, civic) education or information.  
5. Furthermore, the very resources of European institutions, except the ECSC, are 
provided by member States (whose) attitude is often reluctant and suspicious” 
[Rabier 1965: 63] 
 
One by one, Rabier had pointed out the intrinsic flaws of the EC’s 
institutions and of the system of intergovernmental constraints that limited 
their leverage in terms of communication. Overcoming the EC’s 
communication problem would entail two types of solutions. There was a 
material one, consisting in increasing the means of analysis (of media, 
opinions) and of transmission of information. The other was political and 
consisted in giving more freedom and range of action to the information 
services, i.e. to the Commission. In order to do so, States had to be 
persuaded, as they controlled of the budget and granted competences to 
EC institutions.  
 
A few years after Rabier’s remarks, in 1974, the Eurobarometer brought 
the hypostasising power of numbers [Desrosières 1994] to something that 
used to revolve around debatable considerations and impressions. The 
instrument replaced the multitude of subjective visions and controversies 
with a supposedly objective and unequivocal statement based on a 
                                                
31 Outlined in Lazarsfeld, Katz, 1955. 
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supposedly unquestionable form of expertise resulting from a methodology 
resembling a scientific protocol. The Eurobarometer was presented as a 
scientific objectivation of “European public opinion”, to which it instantly 
conferred an almost tangible reality. But this was not enough to transform 
the issue of opinion into a European problem, i.e. a problem shared by 
member states and the EC’s institutions. This only happened when the EU 
entered the realm of “democracy of the public” [Manin, 1995] and the 
legitimacy of its action was correlated to popular support. Until then, the 
Eurobarometer remained confined to the periodical examination of the 
attitude of Europeans towards the European project.  
 
 
THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF OPINION 
IN BUILDING LEGITIMACY FOR EC ACTION 
 
Updating the opinion issue within the Commission 
 
A new institutional problematisation of the issue of European opinion 
took place at the turn of the 1980s-1990s, transforming the place of the 
issue and therefore also the place of the communication staff within the 
EC’s decision-making space. Despite the precocity of Rabier’s assessment, 
the EC’s communication apparatus remained structurally embryonic and in 
charge of secondary tasks until well into the 1980s. The original principle 
of division of information tasks was maintained: the spokesmen were in 
charge of the management of “sensitive” information and daily relations 
with accredited media, while the DG-X was responsible for the 
management of the Commission’s network of representations (mostly in 
member countries) and of contacts with the relays of information, as well 
as for the drafting and diffusion of brochures. DG-X’s confinement to 
mundane tasks of institutional communication was masked by the 
integration of the Spokesman’s Service within DG-X in 1977. From then 
on, DG-X was often directed by a very high-ranking political official (often 
a former Head or Deputy Head of Cabinet of a Commissioner) who gave 
particular attention to the management of the Spokesman’s Service.32 The 
maintenance of these traditional conceptions illustrates the low level of 
interest high-ranking officials and members of the Commissioner college 
accorded to the type of information-communication policy outlined by 
Rabier twenty years earlier. Since the 1960-1970s, each institution as well as 
each division of the Brussels administration set up its own communication 
service [Joana, Smith, 2000], thereby conferring a sectoral, fragmented 
character to the EC’s information task, which reconciled the Commission’s 
aspirations for autonomy but did not openly challenge member States 
suspicious of open intervention in their public spaces.  
 
                                                
32 When President Jenkins merged the Spokesman’s Service and DG-X, Paul Collowald, former Deputy Director 
of the Spokesman’s Service, became Director-General of the DG-X. Collowald’s successors were then also 
former members of cabinets. 
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DG-X’s vocation is not to produce directives; it does not have the 
legitimacy conferred by the institutionalisation of a link with professional 
groups33, unlike other DGs where agents are involved in regular 
transactions and act as mediators between Brussels and “the field”. For this 
reason, DG-X was perceived as weak within intra-institutional games, in 
contrast with the big “historical” DGs such as Internal Market, 
Competition, Secretariat General or Agriculture, who had more power 
(normative competences, “clienteles”), means (budgets, human resources) 
and a reputation for competence (staff training and diplomas, close contact 
with political reality).34 
However, this situation changed radically between 1985 and 1995 due to 
several congruent factors: first, a new configuration of relationships 
between member states and the Commission during the Delors Era 
increased the authority of the latter through the revival of the integration 
process, wider competences and increased political cooperation of member 
states (Maastricht Treaty), with the perspective of a vast enlargement (after 
the collapse of the Soviet Bloc). In addition, Jacques Delors was highly 
interested in opinion issues. Several sources35 describe the Delors 
presidency as a “golden age of opinion” symbolized by the presentation of 
a monthly report on opinion trends (the so-called “Trend” note) during the 
College’s meetings. Prepared by the Unit members in charge of opinion 
monitoring (and therefore of Eurobarometer) and media monitoring, this 
report provided indications on the “climate of opinion” and the 
Commission’s “leverage”. Delors’s interest for opinion issues and 
communication can be explained mainly by his quest for success in his 
great endeavour: the advent of the Single Market in 1992 [Ross, 1995].  
In 1988, the Commission developed the Priority Information Programmes 
(PIP) in order to concentrate information-communication resources on 
priorities determined by the Commission. At the same time a “92 Market” 
information unit (notably in charge of the monthly Objectif 92 magazine)36 
was created within the DG-X. Remarkably, after a long struggle against 
DG-III (Internal Market), DG-X obtained the management of 
“audiovisual policy” [Polo, 2001] and launched the first MEDIA 
program.37 As the Maastricht treaty provided the EC with competences in 
culture and audiovisual medias (within the limits of the subsidiarity 
principle), DG-X was for the first time in its history able to issue directives 
and negotiate with professionals and representatives of the major media 
firms of member countries. The political determination to improve 
communication and the strengthening of the administrative apparatus 
would find an opportunity for expression during the first actual democratic 
“crisis” of the European project. 
                                                
33 On connections with “client groups” as a power resource in the EU’s sectoral bureaucracies, see Mazey and 
Richardson 1993. 
34 The prosopographic study of the highest-ranking European officials shows that having worked in one of these 
« historical » DGs confers “institutional credit” to European careers [Georgakakis, DeLassalle, 2006]. 
35 Among others interviews with Anna Melich (May 2007), formerly in charge of the Eurobarometer (1994-2000) 
and now member of the Bureau of European Policy Advisors (BEPA) Renaud Soufflot-de-Magny (February 
2008), and Ariane Debyser (May 2007), respectively former (1998-2005) and present collaborator of the 
Eurobarometer unit. 
36 In 1987 and 1988, various media campaigns (Europe day, European year, sponsoring of sporting events) and 
more sectoral communication campaigns aimed at women, youth and social partners were launched. See 
European Yearbook, 1988: 15CE. 
37 Adopted by a December 1990 Council decision, the MEDIA I program (1991-1995) had a 200 million ECU 
budget in order to "stimulate and increase the competitive supply capacity of European audiovisual products”. 
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The reinvention of “European public opinion”:  
the instruments of opinion as a solution to the “democratic challenge” 
 
In the early 1990s, a succession of events favoured the expression of this 
new voluntarism in EC communication. The Maastricht Treaty, which 
turned the EEC into the EU, was rejected in the June 1992 Denmark 
referendum38 and was only accepted by a narrow margin by French voters 
in September.39 The referendum failure echoed the relative drop in “public 
support for the EU” measured by the Eurobarometer since autumn 199140 
and the chronically weak participation in European elections.41 At the same 
time, academics pointed to the “half-hearted” support for Europe 
[Percheron, 1993] and the end of the “permissive consensus”42 for a 
European project driven by political elites [Feather, 1994]. Without the 
support of the citizens of member countries, who had become European 
citizens with the ratification of the TEU, it would be difficult for the EU to 
confront the looming political challenges: economic and monetary union; 
integration of the former “popular democracies”; and providing security 
for the European continent. The Commission seized the opportunity 
provided by the mounting grievances and controversies around the 
“democratic challenge” to launch communication campaigns. In January 
1993, Delors entrusted Portuguese Commissioner João de Deus Pinheiro 
with the Commission’s communication policy.43 Around the same time, 
Belgian MEP Willy de Clercq was asked to write a report on the EC 
communication. With the help of senior officials such as then Director-
General of DG-X Colette Flesh and professionals of political 
communication such as President Mitterrand and later Jacques Chirac’s 
communications guru Jacques Pilhan, de Clercq interviewed numerous 
communication and media specialists and in March 1993 came to an 
uncompromising conclusion of the shortcomings of EU policy [Clercq, 
1993].  
 
“After many years of growing impatience, “1992” came and went in an enigmatic 
silence. Politicians and officials of European construction complain that they are 
misunderstood. However, they confine their communication efforts to formal, dry 
and rational information, apparently thinking that someone else will make their 
messages “livelier” for the public. But journalists (who are essential mediators of 
communication) cannot turn boring information into engrossing news items. The 
main reason for this crisis situation lies in the fact that the Commission and some 
of the member states are trying to “sell” the wrong “product”. The product that 
should be “sold” to the public is not the Maastricht Treaty. (…) Trying to “sell 
Maastricht” instead of selling the positive effects that the EU will have on 
everyone of us is a mistake” [Clercq, 1993: 3-4] 
                                                
38 50,4% voted against the ratification of the TEU. 
39 Only 51,04% of votes were cast in favour of the TEU, with more than 30% abstentions.  
40 See Eurobarometer 36, 1991. 
41 The average participation in European elections was 63 % in 1979, 61 % in 1984, 58 % in 1989 and 57 % in 
1994. 
42 The phrase “permissive consensus” was popularised in the 1970s to refer to attitudes towards the 
implementation of the Single Market [Lindberg, Scheingold, 1970]. 
43 Deus Pinheiro’s mandate also included relationships with the EP, relationships with member states on 
Transparency, Communications and Information, Audiovisual and cultural policy and the Publications Office.  
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There were mixed official reactions to the report44 due to the phrasing used 
to describe the course of action (“sell the good ‘product’” to “target 
audiences”) and the solutions deemed necessary (“regain lost credibility”, 
“show the common sense and usefulness of the decisions”, “make the 
proposition relevant”). It did however have consequences, especially the 
remarks on “good instruments” such as the Eurobarometer which, better 
used, could be used to evaluate “the changes in the public’s awareness and 
attitude following information campaigns” [id.: 37]. The Eurobarometer 
tool, which up to that point had only been an experiment developed and 
debated by academics (see box below), became a factor in political 
exchanges and even a policy instrument.  
 
 
J . -R. Rabier ,  the  entrepreneur  and h is  entrepr i s e  
 
Former Head of Cabinet for Jean Monnet in the ECSC’s High Authority, J.-R. Rabier 
became Director-General of the Information Service in 1960 until the latter was 
transformed into a Directorate-General in 1967. He was appointed as Director-General of 
DG-X in 1970 but was replaced by an Irish official after the first enlargement (1973). The 
new French President of the Commission, François-Xavier Ortoli, granted him the title of 
Honorary Director-General, which allowed him to remain a member of DG-X, where his 
mission was to systematize opinion polls on the integration process. With very few 
resources (he had only one agent at his disposal), he coordinated the Eurobarometer’s 
semesterly surveys until the mid 1980s, with the support of a small group of academics 
interested in the international comparison of political attitudes and values. 
 
A contributor to the French Esprit magazine in the late 1940s, Rabier had been interested in 
public opinion issues ever since his training in political science, and had made connections 
with academics working on the subject early on. Thus he was closely in touch with J. 
Stoetzel and Hélène Riffaut, specialists of opinion and heads successively of IFOP and the 
Faits et Opinions institute which was in charge of the Eurobarometer during the first fifteen 
years of its existence (from n°0 to n°31). A small team of researchers grew around them, 
mainly from the Political Science Department of the University of Geneva (created in 1969). 
Along with Dujan Sidjanski, the founder and director of the department, there was a Ph-D 
student from Barcelona, Anna Melich (who would then be in charge of the Eurobarometer), 
a young American political scientist from the University of Michigan, Ronald Inglehart, who 
was a visiting professor in Geneva in 1969-1970 and collaborated with Eurobarometer for 
several years. The tool’s conception was strongly influenced by these researchers’ scientific 
agenda, in particular by Inglehart who at the time was studying post-materialistic values and 
their effects on the attitudes of European populations [Inglehart, 1971] and played a crucial 
part in the construction of surveys and the elaboration of analytical indicators45 The links 
between Rabier and these academics led to a series of scientific publications [Rabier, 1964; 
Inglehart, Rabier, 1984; Reif, Inglehart, 1991] 
 
Since the 1970s, every report, resolution, written question related to the 
information policy recommends the extensive use of this tool. But due to the 
absence of a strong political will, the tool remained for a long time limited to 
biannual polls sponsored by the Commission providing a reflection of popular 
opinion towards Europe in member countries. Thanks to the stability of its 
methodology46 and its frequency, the tool offers a longitudinal comparability 
                                                
44 See in the international press notably Tom Burke, “Selling’ the EC Image: Brussels Bid Falls Flat”, International 
Herald Tribune, April 1, 1993 
45  R. Inglehart’s theoretical model can be found in Inglehart, 1977. He is now the coordinator of an Ann Arbor-
based World Values Survey. 
46 Some questions have remained almost unchanged since 1974, hence their labelling as “trend” questions 
(“Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership of the European Community (Common 
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which mostly interested specialists of opinion. The politicization of the 
“European opinion” issue however upset both the tool and its uses. The first 
indicator of this evolution is the increasing number of thematic ad hoc polls 
conducted at the request of particular DGs on specific issues (inflation, 
languages, energy policy, agricultural policy, single currency, etc.). 68 special 
Eurobarometers were conducted between 1974 and 1992 (i.e. 3.5 per year on 
average), whereas 219 were conducted between 1993 and 2007 (more than 14.5 
per year). The second indicator is the appearance and subsequent multiplication 
of the Flash Eurobarometers: polls conducted over the phone that can focus 
on a single country or category of people (CEOs, agricultural workers, youth). 
235 such surveys have been conducted at the time of writing. In addition, 
between 1994 and 1997, the European Continuous Tracking Survey (CTS) was 
launched in order to provide monthly monitoring based on 200 phone 
interviews in each member state. From 2001 onwards, “qualitative surveys” 
were added based on the focus group method.  
 
From the 1990s, the Eurobarometer tool was not only “a valuable feedback 
element on what affects citizens the most”47, it was also a precious instrument 
for public policy, allowing decision-makers to have a snapshot of opinion on a 
given question, evaluate their leverage or windows of opportunity for a 
particular policy proposal, develop campaigns directed to relevant audiences or 
the general public.48 We can even say that, in the political configuration and 
shifts of the structures of the institutional game between 1985 and 1995, the 
tool served three separate goals which, combined, have contributed to the 
transformation of the Community information problem into the European 
opinion problem. 1/ The first goal is the symbolic creation of a “European 
public opinion”, i.e. an audience specific to Europe, expressing its expectations 
and fears about European decisions. The tool “organically” produced the 
appearance of a transnational public opinion through powerful instruments of 
objectification such as numbers, percentages, statistical tables, and graphic 
representations (histograms, linear curves, pie charts, geographic 
representations, etc…).49 2/ The second objective is the justification of the 
ongoing supranational project. Without excessively pushing the orientation of 
the questions and the interpretation of the results, the tool induces an apparent 
desire for Europe of the pollees by questioning them on their agreement with 
positively connoted attitudes towards dialogue and cooperation between 
member states.   3/ The third underlying objective, related to the second, is the 
legitimization of the Commission’s increased communication effort vis-à-vis 
member states and the Parliament – the Commission being the only institution 
capable of responding to the lack of information on Europe recorded by 
Eurobarometer surveys (see box below). Seen in the light of the 
Eurobarometer results, the apathy of Europeans towards Europe was 
                                                                                                                                      
Market) is: a good thing/a bad thing/neither good or bad?”). Along with other questions, they act as indicators 
on the “climate of opinion”.  
47 In the words of Jorge de Oliveira e Sousa, who was briefly Director-General of DG Press and Communication 
(2003). 
48 Several interviews conducted in 2007 with senior officials from DG-COMM and DG-MARKET attest to this 
use. Also see Smith, 1997.on this topic.  
49 This “reality effect” is produced by the method and the modelling it enables. The Commission’s measuring tool 
is indeed based on the “sociologically debatable” premises of the polling method criticized by Pierre Bourdieu 
in the following terms: everybody has an opinion; all opinions are equivalent; there is a consensus on 
controversial problems (Bourdieu, 1984: 222). Moreover, the theme imposed (Europe) increases the “feeling of 
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interpreted as the consequence of a lack of information, of communication, 
and thus presented as a problem which could be solved through an extension 
of the capacity of Brussels to “talk” directly to the populations of member 
states. 
 
 
The s t ruc tura l  pro -Europe e f f e c t  o f  Eurobarometer  surveys 
 
Because of the biases in the formulation of the questions and the limited range of possible 
answers available, the famous “trend questions” tend to artificially produce the existence of 
a “European public opinion” as well as the idea of a strong adhesion to European 
integration. For example, the following question, used to measure the respondent’s support 
to their country’s adhesion to the EU - “Taking everything into account, would you say that 
(our country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of European Union? 
Benefited – Not benefited – Don’t Know”- has since 1974 invariably received 50% of 
positive answers or more. 
More generally, the word choice, the tone of the questions and the implicit alternative in the 
question create a pro-Europe effect on the latitude respondents have in their answers. The 
following question shows this effect: “For each of the following areas, do you think that 
decisions should be made by the (nationality) Government, or made jointly within the 
European Union? Fighting crime / Taxation / Fighting unemployment / Fighting terrorism 
/ Defence and foreign affairs / Immigration / The educational system / Pensions / 
Protecting the environment”. 
For such serious issues, clearly perceived as transnational (but not necessarily European), 
answers appear as an unconditional support for a common resolution implicating the EU. 
79% of respondents believe that decisions on fighting terrorism should be made jointly 
within the EU, 71% for protecting the environment, 70% for scientific research, 64% for 
defence and foreign affairs, 62% for support to regions… (EB 69, Spring 2008). The 
authors of Eurobarometer reports hastily claim that “Europeans continue to favour 
decision-making at European level” (id.: 14). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
incompetence” of the pollees with the remote, abstract character (“disconnected from everyday issues”) of the 
problems posed and the political bias of the questions (Bourdieu, 1979: 466 467). 
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From the “information policy of the Communities”  
to the “European communication policy” 
 
Since the 1990s, Commission communication has made good use of its 
instruments and their intrinsic legitimacy. Without a clear legal foundation, the 
Commission’s communication apparatus has acquired ever more sophisticated 
means and has became progressively desectorized, even giving up the traditional 
discourse of the duty to advertise political action [Lascoumes, 2001] in order to 
become a transversal repertoire of the EU’s legitimization task. Year after year, 
the functions – and therefore the technical, financial and human resources – 
attributed to the task of information have been officially requalified in terms of 
“communication strategy”50 and “governance”. The “governance” concept, 
officially theorized in a Commission White Paper [European Commission, 2001], 
links two logics: informational transparency and the participation of relevant 
citizens – stakeholders – in the decision-making process. The institutional theory of 
governance built the foundations of a participatory shift in opinion management, 
later completed by the “communication strategy” adopted by the Commission in 
2002 [European Commission, 2002], and confirmed in subsequent programs.51 
 
Each European crisis has been the occasion for the Commission to increase its 
authority within the EU on the “European opinion” problem. If the resignation 
of the Santer College in March 1999 temporarily weakened its capacity for action 
and initiative, the failure of the Rome II treaty (TEC) in the French (May 2005) 
and Dutch (June 2005) referendums paradoxically gave the Commission an 
opportunity to regain the upper hand. The results of these referendums 
immediately revived the debates on the “democratic challenge” around a new 
imperative: “closing the gap with citizens”.52 Even before the advent of this new 
crisis, President Barroso, when setting up his College in November 2004, had 
expressed the wish that communication constitute a portfolio in its own right in 
order to favour the ratification of the TEC. This mandate – exceptional in the 
Commission’s history – was entrusted to Swedish Commissioner Margot 
Wallström, symbolically appointed Vice-President of the Commission in charge 
of the “communication strategy and inter-institutional relations”. The recognition 
of the Commission’s role in the resolution of European opinion problems was 
made clear in the conclusions of the June 2005 council, which called for a 
“period of reflexion to allow for a broad debate” on the future of the EU in 
which the Commission was mandated to lead a “mobilizing debate” on Europe.53 
In the summer of 2005, it had already adopted texts recommending that DGs 
professionalize “European communication” by systematically integrating public 
expectations, fears and perceptions, as well as communication goals (preparing 
                                                
50 The “communication strategy” qualification appeared incidentally in the 1980s and was officially sanctioned in 
the De Clercq report [Clercq 1993]. The term “strategy” became part of the official terminology in the early 
2000s [European Commission, 2002]. 
51 This procedural legitimization contrasts with the analysis that limits the EU’s capacity of legitimization to its 
outputs, thus caught in a “negative integration” trap which makes it more efficient in the correction and 
harmonisation of national policies, especially market distortions, than in the elaboration of new public policies 
[Scharpf, 1999]. 
52 This expression was the focus of a consultative forum organized by the European Economic and Social 
Committee in November 2005 and was used again in the 2006 White Paper [European Commission, 2006]. 
53  The paradox introduced by the Eurobarometer results can be found in the Heads of State’s statement: “We 
have noted the outcome of the referendums in France and the Netherlands. We consider that these results do 
not call into question citizens' attachment to the construction of Europe. Citizens have nevertheless expressed 
concerns and worries which need to be taken into account.” (European Council, 2005) 
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budgets, planning and communication strategy) in the first stages of the chain of 
normative or legislative production. The Action plan to improve communicating Europe 
by the Commission states: 
 
“Commissioners and their DGs will insure that communication aspects are included right 
from the beginning of all policy formulation. […]. Key proposals will be accompanied 
with a “layperson’s summary” explaining the personal and societal benefits of the policy. 
A communication plan will be prepared by the DG concerned when the topic so 
necessitates. Clear, simple and precise drafting of Commission proposals is essential if 
they are to be transparent, readily understandable and their rationale fully endorsable by 
citizens and business. “Eurojargon” or “Eurospeak” is confusing, complicated and often 
elitist.” [European Commission, 2005a: 7] 
 
A few months later, the “plan D” adopted in October 2005 by the Commission 
on M. Wallström’s initiative announced the organization of debates and 
participative forums throughout Europe and set up a new frame of action 
involving all partners of the European institutional game: 
“Any vision of the future of Europe needs to build on a clear view on citizen’s needs and 
expectations. […] The Commission will present a specific Eurobarometer survey on the 
future of Europe, assessing citizens’ views on the future of the European project as well 
as citizens’ support for and expectations of European policies and actions.” [European 
Commission, 2005b: 2 and 10] 
 
Forty years after J.-R. Rabier [Rabier, 1965] expressed his aspirations, these 
statements attest to a radical change. Beyond the calls for more rationality, 
coordination and professionalism, the Commission now possesses the authority 
to assess and address the problem of “European communication”. It defines the 
objectives and the lines of action with its expert instruments. As we have seen, 
this shift is primarily the result of a gradual shift in perspective of the institutional 
framing of the opinion problem which took place in various stages mainly 
through a dramatization of the supposed “democratic deficit” and a changing use 
of the Eurobarometer. Following this line of thought, we can ask if the White 
Paper on a European communication policy published in February 2006 by the 
Commission is a sign of a final evolution in this process of affirmation of 
Brussels’ legitimate role in the communication within member states’ public 
spaces as one of the main proposals of the Commission suggests: 
“Communication should become a EU policy in its own right, at the service of 
the citizens” [European Commission, 2006: 4]. The reception of this proposal by 
other EU institutions has probably played a part in this White Paper’s relative 
failure [Aldrin, Utard, 2008], temporarily sidetracking the proposal, at least until 
the next European crisis. 
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